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**The Pentagon**

DD-68-25-1

5 February 1968

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Dr. Tordella. He also requests that you ask Dr. Tucker to return same  
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**Deputy Director****DepDir/Elec & Info Sys/DRE**

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**SUBJECT: Possible Damage Resulting from Compromise of Technical Support Material and Collection Equipments on the PUEBLO**

The USS PUEBLO carried SIGINT technical documents and equipments tailored to support the intelligence mission assigned.

The mission included target communications of North Korea [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Message traffic from the PUEBLO as well as the North Koreans indicated a destruction effort on board the vessel before she was captured. Since the exact destruction of SIGINT materials cannot be ascertained until members of the SIGINT team are returned and interrogated, the following assessment describes the damage which may accrue to the intelligence effort if all SIGINT documents and equipments were captured intact.

The technical support documentation would reveal both in its detail and its over-all effect our general mastery of techniques to collect, analyze, and exploit most foreign target communications. Specifically, the material directly reveals or implies: (a) the extent and positioning of collection resources world-wide which for most part are already revealed or inferred; (b) the intensity and relative priority assigned each effort; (c) the depth of our understanding of target techniques and capabilities; (d) our ability to construct complex intercept equipments to match target emissions; and (e) some successes against foreign cryptographic methods.

The information that could be gleaned from a complete reconstruction of the technical materials on board would vary between the target countries involved and with cryptologic methods used.

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(b) (3) - 50 USC 403  
(b) (3) - 18 USC 798  
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
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### 3. Korean Communists



### CONCLUSIONS:

At this juncture there still remain certain critical unknowns regarding the extent of which classified information and equipment may have been jettisoned or destroyed by the crew of the USS PUEBLO.

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For lack of more definitive information regarding the specific identification of the documents and equipment which may have fallen into the hands of the North Koreans, our damage assessment must be couched in foreboding tones. If some of the more sensitive documents were actually captured, translation and interpolation of the information contained would require extensive efforts before their compromise could be detected in effective countermeasures. Ultimately, however, it can be anticipated that communist efforts in communications security will be greatly increased in those areas specifically covered by the captured documents, but we can also anticipate an over-all concentration of Soviet, KORCOM (and perhaps CHICOM) communication security endeavors even in areas of communication activity not covered by the captured documents. Moreover, it is reasonable to postulate that Soviet, KORCOM and CHICOM efforts to strengthen the communication security practices throughout the entire communist bloc will be undertaken. Should this in fact occur, the general level of SIGINT information now available to the U.S. intelligence community will be reduced. Exactly how much and in what areas we cannot say at this time.